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TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA* 
I.  MY FIRST THREE MEMORIES OF LEGAL ETHICS 
It is unusual what the mind remembers.  My first recollection of wanting to 
become a lawyer was in grade school, when the teacher told each of us to write 
a paper on what we wanted to be.  I was probably in eighth grade.  I decided 
that I wanted to be a lawyer.  I do not know why I made that choice.  I did not 
know any lawyers.  My parents never had the opportunity to attend college; my 
mother never even attended high school.  My father emphasized education, but 
it was up to me to decide on a career. 
In order to collect information on lawyers for my grade school paper, I 
wrote the state bar in Illinois, where I lived.  The bar sent me its code of 
professional responsibility.  I remember one thing: that one of the rules of 
professional responsibility stated that it was unethical to charge less than a 
certain amount of money per hour.  I do not remember the exact amount, for it 
was many years ago.  Let us say it was fifty dollars per hour.  I do remember 
that, whatever the hourly amount was, it was more than what my father earned 
in a good day. 
Think about that.  It would be unethical for a lawyer to charge less per 
hour than my father earned in a full day.  He is retired now, but at the time, he 
was a skilled, self-employed, blue collar worker (a sign painter).  He often 
worked ten hours a day.  Yet, it would be unethical for a lawyer to charge less 
per hour than he would earn in a good day. 
What struck me at the time was that the legal profession said it was 
unethical to charge too little.  Of course, we all like to earn more, but other 
occupations did not say that it was a sin to earn too little. 
While lawyers (or any skilled professionals) are not surprised that they 
typically earn more than blue collar workers, it was many years before my 
father appreciated the size of that difference.  That is a second memory that 
sticks in my mind.  The summer after my first year of law school, I had a job in 
the law department of the First National Bank of Chicago.  As my father was 
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driving me to the train station, he said that it was good working for a bank—
indoor work and no heavy lifting.  But, he warned, the salaries are not that 
high; he was thinking of bank tellers.  I told him my salary and his mouth 
dropped—I was earning substantially more money than he was.  I was twenty-
three years old and he was fifty-three, and I was making more.  Now, I saved 
all my money to pay for tuition and school expenses, so my high salary was a 
good thing for him.  It all went in the same pot.  Still, his mouth dropped. 
There is a third memory that I still recall after all these years, and it relates 
to this second memory because it deals with the competitive advantage that 
lawyers have because of the ethics rules.1  This competitive advantage serves 
to lift incomes.  During law school, I never took a class in Professional 
Responsibility or Legal Ethics.  There was no requirement to take such a 
course, and, like most students, I never did.  But when I was working for the 
First National Bank that summer, a legal ethics issue involving “unauthorized 
practice” arose.  As most lawyers know, it is “unauthorized practice” and a 
crime in most states for a nonlawyer to practice law.2  The unauthorized 
practice issue surfaced because of a typical problem for many couples at the 
time.  When the husband or wife died, the surviving spouse sometimes found 
that he or she could not get access to the joint bank account because of possible 
state estate taxes due.  The spouse simply filed a form with the state indicating 
that there would be no taxes owed because the estate was so small. 
The problem was that many bank customers were not educated enough to 
navigate the form.  The bank, as a courtesy, would send these people to 
lawyers in its trust department who would tell them how to fill out the form.  
Some lawyers not working at the bank complained of the competition, arguing 
that the bank was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.3  And so the 
bank, which charged no money for this activity, stopped offering the free 
service rather than fight the charge. 
Those memories have stuck with me for years.  Legal ethics told us that it 
was unethical to charge too low a fee; that it was unethical for banks to 
compete with lawyers—even when the bank used lawyers duly admitted to the 
bar to perform competently a service, at no charge, for its customers, who did 
not complain.  And, finally, given the restrictions on competition with lawyers, 
it should not be surprising that lawyers can make a lot of money.  I recalled 
those memories again when I started teaching in law school and the dean asked 
me to offer a course on legal ethics. 
 
 1. See generally Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977) (arguing that ethics rules for lawyers are self-serving and should be 
reformed to protect the public and the client). 
 2. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S 
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY §§ 5.5-3–5.5-6 (4th ed. 2006). 
 3. See id. at § 5.5-7. 
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II.  POST-WATERGATE MORALITY 
As I started teaching, the American Bar Association (ABA) was about to 
require a course in legal ethics as part of its response to our post-Watergate 
morality.4  There had been a moving and painful moment during the televised 
Senate Watergate Committee hearings during the testimony of John Dean, the 
former Counsel to President Nixon.  Dean disclosed that he had earlier made a 
list of the people that he thought could be involved in a conspiracy to obstruct 
justice.5  Next to many of the names was an asterisk.6  One of the Senators 
questioning him asked what the asterisks represented.7  John Dean indicated 
that they were the lawyers: 
JOHN DEAN: “I put a little asterisk beside each lawyer . . . how in God’s 
name could so many lawyers get involved in something like this?” 8 
The law school dean thought that I must know something about legal 
ethics because I had just finished my work with the Senate Watergate 
Committee.  Fortunately, when the dean turned to me, I was able to turn to 
Tom Morgan, another professor, also on the University of Illinois faculty at the 
time.  Without him, there never would have come into existence Problems and 
Materials on Professional Responsibility.9 
Besides the complex rules against unauthorized practice, the law of ethics 
was easy to summarize in 1974 when I began teaching the subject: don’t 
charge too little, and don’t lie, cheat, steal, or advertise.  That soon changed. 
The old epigram that one should be careful for what one wishes because it 
may become true, applies to rules that mandated teaching the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  When law professors analyzed the legal rules, 
they often did not like what they saw.  A primary instrument of change in the 
 
 4. See Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching 
of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 148 (1996).  The ABA Standards for Approval of 
Law Schools was “first adopted in August, 1973, in the midst of the Watergate disclosures.”  Id.  
It provided: 
The law school shall: . . . require of all candidates for the first professional degree, 
instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the legal profession. Such required 
instruction need not be limited to any pedagogical method as long as the history, goals, 
structure and responsibilities of the legal profession and its members, including the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, are all covered. 
ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 302(a)(iv) (1995).  This 
professional responsibility requirement is the only substantive teaching requirement imposed by 
the ABA.  Cramton & Koniak, supra, at 148. 
 5. Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972: Hearing on S. Res. 60 Before the S. Comm. on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong. 1053 (1973) (statement of John Dean). 
 6. Id. at 1054. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1976).  This book is now in its ninth edition. 
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law governing lawyers’ ethics has been lawsuits, supported by scholarly 
research and commentary.  Later, the American Law Institute’s Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, published in 2000, continued the 
efforts to reform.10 
The ethics rules have changed over the years, often because the courts have 
prodded, cajoled, and forced the organized bar to change.  The year I started 
teaching legal ethics, the Supreme Court ruled that bar ethics rules that 
establish minimum fee schedules violate antitrust laws.11  Later, the Court held 
that state rules prohibiting legal advertising violated the free speech rights of 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.12  But many courts—in the name of 
legal ethics—still protect the lawyer’s monopoly over legal services, even 
when the people who perform the work are lawyers admitted to the bar (albeit 
the bar of a different state) and there is no claim that the work is incompetent.13 
Oddly enough, while the content of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct have changed substantially over the years, the basic format and 
outline of our ethics book has not, although it is now in its ninth edition.14  The 
original book, like its subsequent editions, focused on the ABA ethics rules 
and sought to teach the students what the ethics rules are, because the ethics 
lawyer must know those rules as well as the tax lawyer knows the Internal 
Revenue Code.  But, because the law changes, and because what the law ought 
to be affects what it will be, the ethics lawyer must know why the rules exist in 
the present form, their policy or economic justifications, and why they may be 
likely to change. 
Our ethics book created problems that brought out issues that one could 
analyze effectively only by applying these ethics rules.15  Those problems and 
the basic organization of the book have remained very similar over the years, 
even though the answers to many of the questions have changed because the 
rules have changed. 
 
 10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000).  Although this 
Restatement is titled “Third,” there was never a Restatement (First) or Restatement (Second) on 
this topic.  See also THOMAS D. MORGAN, ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 
LAWYER LAW: COMPARING THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH THE 
ALI RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2005). 
 11. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
 12. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). 
 13. See, e.g., Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 
(Cal. 1998) (holding that a New York law firm violated a California statute, which restricted the 
practice of law to persons who are members of the state bar, by representing a California client 
with attorneys who were not members of the California bar). 
 14. Compare MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 9, with THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (9th ed. 2006). 
 15. Our book was the first one to focus on the problem method of teaching ethics.  Now, 
most of the other ethics books in this crowded field also use the problem method, which has 
proved to be a very effective method of teaching this subject. 
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Another thing that has changed over the years is that we have gone from a 
dearth of case law to an overabundance.  There is now a lot of case law 
disciplining lawyers, disqualifying them, or holding them liable in tort for 
violations of ethics rules that, in the first edition, were mere hypotheticals.  
Sadly, life imitates art, and at this point, we have many examples of lawyers 
paying the price for ethical violations that the past punished less harshly or not 
at all.  What were simply musings of law professors have become real-life 
threats, giving students an incentive to take the course seriously. 
III.  POST-ENRON MORALITY 
In response to the Enron bankruptcy and the involvement of the legal and 
accounting professionals, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.16  Among 
other things, Sarbanes-Oxley imposed new duties on lawyers.17  Since its 
enactment, the federal government has filed quite a number of charges against 
lawyers who allegedly knew about or participated in corporate fraud.18  In this 
post-Enron world, the federal government has indicted an “astonishing number 
of lawyers” in corporate fraud cases.19  The “sheer number of in-house counsel 
 
 16. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745-84 (2002); 
15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).  Congress required the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to: 
issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum 
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the 
Commission in any way in the representation of issuers, including a rule— 
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities law or 
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the 
chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the equivalent 
thereof); and 
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence (adopting, as 
necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the violation), 
requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of the board of 
directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board of directors comprised solely 
of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors. 
Id.; see also Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers and 
Auditors, 29 J. CORP. L. 397 (2004) (examining the problems lawyers and auditors confront when 
they evaluate and respond to risk, and examining ways that the gatekeeper function addresses 
these problems). 
 17. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 2, at §§ 1.6-12(b); 1.6-12 (e)(4); 1.13-1(c); 1.13-
2(c). 
 18. Richard M. Strassberg, David B. Pitofsky & Samantha L. Schreiber, Lawyers on Trial: 
Government Views Attorneys as ‘First Line of Defense’ Against Corporate Malfeasance, N.Y. 
L.J., Jul. 18, 2005, at 9. 
 19. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 2, at §§ 1.6-12(b); 1.6-12 (e)(4); 1.13-1(c); 1.13-
2(c); Strassberg, Pitofsky & Schreiber, supra note 18; see also LUCIAN T. PERA & BRIAN S. 
FAUGHNAN, ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL, PARADISE TARNISHED: TODAY’S SOURCES OF 
LIABILITY EXPOSURE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL 2 (2005), available at http://www.acca.com/ 
public/article/ethics/liability.pdf; John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer 
Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 489 n.435 (2003). 
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prosecutions in the last few years is unheard of in a segment of the profession 
that historically has never been at the front of the prosecutors’ radar.”20 
Consider a few recent examples.  In 2004, Stephen Woghin, the former 
general counsel of Computer Associates, pled guilty to obstruction of justice in 
connection with coaching company employees to provide false testimony to 
investigators.21  Two years earlier, the SEC charged that Franklin C. Brown, 
the former vice chairman and chief legal officer of Rite Aid Corp., and others 
“were responsible for one of the most egregious accounting frauds in recent 
history.”22  “At age seventy-six and after being fitted with a pacemaker, Brown 
was sentenced to ten years in prison,” after being convicted of ten felony 
counts, including lying to federal regulators.23 
Compare that punishment with what the court meted out to Michael 
Milken, the junk-bond king.  In 1989, just fifteen years earlier, Rudy Giuliani, 
then U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, prosecuted Milken 
for ninety-eight counts of racketeering and insider trading.24  Milken, who is 
not a lawyer, pled guilty to six counts of various securities and reporting 
 
 20. PERA & FAUGHNAN, supra note 19, at 2–3. 
 21. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Computer Associates Executives Indicted 
on Securities Fraud, Obstruction Charges (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
opa/pr/2004/September/04_crm_642.htm. 
[Computer Associates] retained a law firm to represent it in connection with the 
government investigations.  Shortly after being retained, the company’s law firm met with 
Kumar, Richards, Woghin and other CA executives in order to inquire into their 
knowledge of the practices that were the subject of the government investigations.  During 
these meetings, the defendants and others allegedly failed to disclose, falsely denied and 
concealed the existence of the 35-day month practice.  [The indictment explained that the 
goal of the “35-day month” was to permit CA to report that it met or exceeded its 
projected quarterly revenue and earnings when, in fact, it had not.]  Kumar, Richards, 
Woghin and others allegedly presented to the law firm an assortment of false justifications 
to explain away evidence of the 35-day month practice.  The indictment alleges that 
Kumar, Richards and Woghin knew, and in fact intended, that the company’s law firm 
would present these false justifications to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the SEC and the FBI 
in an attempt to persuade the government that the 35-day month practice never existed.  
The indictment further alleges that Kumar frequently instructed Woghin to meet with CA 
employees prior to their being interviewed by the government or the company’s lawyers 
to coach them on how to answer questions without disclosing the 35-day month practice. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 22. SEC Litigation Release No. 17577, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Rite Aid’s Former 
Management Team Charged with Securities Fraud by SEC (June 21, 2002), available at 
http://ftp.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17577.htm. 
 23. Joseph Savage & Christine Sgarlata Chung, Trends in Corporate Fraud Enforcement: A 
Calm During the Storm?, BUS. CRIMES BULL. (Law Journal Newsletters), Oct. 2005, at 1–2, 
available at www.goodwinprocter.com/getfile.aspx?filepath=/Files/publications/savage_chung_ 
10_05.pdf. 
 24. Editorial, Junk Sentence for Milken, NAT’L REV., Dec. 17, 1990, at 17. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS 1229 
violations.25  Judge Kimba Wood recommended a ten-year prison sentence and 
said that Milken should serve at least thirty-six to forty months.26  In fact, he 
served only about twenty-two27 months and remained a wealthy man with a net 
worth of at least $700 million, even after paying $900 million in fines and 
settlements (including civil law suits).28 
The SEC has not been sitting on the sidelines.  One study concluded that 
the SEC, during the first eight months of 2005, has barred or suspended at least 
eighteen lawyers from practicing before the SEC.29  By comparison, it 
disbarred or suspended three lawyers in 2004, five in 2003, and only one each 
in 2002 and 2001.30 
In addition to criminal and SEC enforcement, there is the risk of tort 
liability and disqualification. One does not need an economics degree to 
conclude that lawyers pay more attention to legal ethics when the results affect 
their pocket books.  One accomplished lawyer told me that, about twenty years 
ago, when he began working for a well-known malpractice insurer, the head 
lawyer told him to read, first, the ABA Model Rules, cover-to-cover.  He was 
surprised: What does this have to do with insuring law firms?  After a short 
time on the job, he learned that a major risk with blue chip law firms is not that 
they are likely to miss a statute of limitations.  Rather, it is that large law firms 
will be involved in a conflict of interest or violation of another ethics rule that 
leads to tort liability. 
For example, Baltimore’s Venable, Baetjer & Howard settled, for $27 
million, a lawsuit involving conflicts of interests.31  New York’s Milberg 
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach settled, for $50 million, a malicious 
prosecution case brought against a lawyer.32  The law firm, after losing a jury 
verdict for $45 million for malicious prosecution, settled by wiring a check for 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 448 (1991). 
 27. See Daniel J. Kornstein, Review of Lawyer: A Life Of Counsel And Controversy, N.Y. 
L.J., Sept. 18, 1998, at 2; Milken Released To Halfway House, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 4, 1993, 
at 1; Today’s News: Update, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 5, 1991, at 1; Jayne O’Donnell & Richard Willing, 
Prison Time Gets Harder For White-Collar Crooks, USA TODAY, May 12, 2003, at 1A. 
 28. See Emily Lambert & Monte Burke, Dishonor Roll, FORBES, Mar. 29, 2004, at 46; 
Margaret A. Jacobs, Threats, Tension Electrify Trade Center Trial, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1993, 
at B1. 
 29. Savage & Chung, supra note 23, at 2. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Kirk Victor, Venable Agrees to $27M Accord, NAT’L L.J., May 25, 1987, at 3.  A 
precursor of some of these conflicts problems may be found in Ronald D. Rotunda, Law, 
Lawyers, and Managers, in THE ETHICS OF CORPORATE CONDUCT 127 (Clarence C. Walton ed. 
1977). 
 32. Richard B. Schmitt, Milberg Weiss Agrees to Pay $50 Million to Settle Lexecon Case, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1999, at B17. 
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$50 million before the jury could deliberate on punitive damages.33  A few 
years later, a Los Angeles federal grand jury indicted the law firm for perjury, 
bribery, obstruction of justice, and fraud.34  The court in In re Futuronics Corp. 
denied a law firm over one million dollars in fees under the Bankruptcy Code 
because of a prohibited fee-splitting arrangement and failure to comply with 
disclosure provisions for joint representation.35 This list will never be 
complete. 
Disbarment, suspension, reprimand, or other forms of legal discipline are 
not the real fears of lawyers, for they pale in comparison to the more realistic 
risk of tort liability and disqualification. 
IV.  WHY JAPAN WANTS MORE LAWYERS 
The recent years have seen more competition in the practice of law, as 
courts and the state bars have revised ethical rules that restricted the free 
market.36  That has benefited clients, but it has not caused lawyers to cry 
poverty.  The average lawyer today earns about $100,000 per year.37  That high 
income level is not a sign of an overcrowded or underpaid profession: if there 
 
 33. Id.; Karen Donovan, Milberg Weiss’ $50M Mistake, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 26, 1999, at A1. 
 34. Julie Creswell, U.S. Indictment for Big Law Firm in Class Actions, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 
2006, at A1. 
 35. Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 
463, 468–71 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Halbert v. Yousif, 225 B.R. 336, 343 (E.D. Mich. 1998). 
Upon review of the record, this Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court correctly 
determined that Halbert violated several other fiduciary obligations that had been imposed 
upon him by bankruptcy law.  Based on these acts of misconduct, the Bankruptcy Court 
assessed the totality of Halbert’s violations and concluded that “[t]he only proper 
response” to those deficiencies was to deny his fee applications. 
Id.  The court then concluded that the decision to deny the attorney all fees for services that he 
provided in a Chapter 11 case of debtor-corporation was not an abuse of discretion; however, the 
lawyer’s disinterestedness and disclosure violations in a Chapter 11 case of debtor-corporation 
did not permit any denial of compensation for services that the lawyer performed in separate 
Chapter 11 cases of corporate principals.  Id. at 360. 
 36. Thomas D. Morgan, Economic Reality Facing 21st Century Lawyers, 69 WASH. L. REV. 
625, 626 (1994). 
 37. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3 n.3 
(7th ed. 2000).  The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported in 2000 that the median earnings of all 
lawyers was $88,280; 25% earned more than $130,000 and 25% earned less than $60,700.  
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2000 NATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL 
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE ESTIMATES (2001), available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/2000/ 
oes231011.htm (last visited May 20, 2007).  The salaries of the largest law firms exceeds this 
median.  A survey of the 100 largest U.S. law firms found the median profits per partner at those 
firms in 1997 was $587,000.  John E. Morris, Too Good to Be True?, AM. LAW., Jul.-Aug. 1998, 
at 5.  “In 1999, 17 of the 20 top-grossing firms in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area had 
profits per partner of at least $500,000.”  Ronald D. Rotunda, A Few Modest Proposals to Reform 
the Law Governing Federal Judicial Salaries, 12 PROF. LAW. 1 (Fall 2000). 
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was an oversupply of lawyers, we would expect that their salaries would be 
lower than $100,000 per year. 
These high salaries do what we would expect high salaries to do: they draw 
talented people into the profession.  There are more than one million lawyers 
in the United States today38—“about three times as many lawyers per capita as 
any other comparable society.”39 
Over twenty years ago, Harvard President Derek Bok, a lawyer, 
complained about that.  He moaned about a “massive diversion of exceptional 
talent into [law and other] pursuits that often add little to the growth of the 
economy, the pursuit of culture, or the enhancement of the human spirit.”40  He 
continued: 
I cannot press this point too strongly. . . . [T]he supply of exceptional people is 
limited.  Yet far too many of these rare individuals are becoming lawyers at a 
time when the country cries out for more talented business executives, more 
enlightened public servants, more inventive engineers, more able high school 
principals and teachers. . . . A nation’s values and problems are mirrored in the 
ways in which it uses its ablest people.  In Japan, a country only half our size, 
30 percent more engineers graduate each year than in all the United States.  
But Japan boasts a total of less than 15,000 lawyers, while American 
universities graduate 35,000 every year.  It would be hard to claim that these 
differences have no practical consequences.  As the Japanese put it, “Engineers 
make the pie grow larger; lawyers only decide how to carve it up.”41 
Yet, the Japanese economy over the last several decades has not grown 
nearly as much as the U.S. economy.42  And Japan is now trying to increase 
the number of its lawyers!43  That is right: the Japanese reject Derek Bok’s 
 
 38. Ichiko Fuyuno, Japan Grooms New Lawyers: Slew of Law Schools Open Up, as 
Deregulation Spurs Litigation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2004, at A18.  In 1900, that number was 
only about 100,000.  Thomas D. Morgan, Practicing Law in the Interests of Justice in the Twenty-
First Century, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1793, 1794 (2002). 
 39. Frank B. Cross, The First Thing We Do, Let’s Kill All the Economists: An Empirical 
Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and Political System, 70 TEX. 
L. REV. 645, 646 (1992); Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many 
Lawyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 431, 432–33 (1989). 
 40. Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 
573 (1983). 
 41. Id. at 573–74. 
 42. See, e.g., Jonathan Fuerbringer, Market Place: All Is Right with the World (Well, Not So 
Bad, at Least), and U.S. Treasuries Are in the Doldrums, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1999, at C15 
(noting no evidence of a Japanese economic turn-around while the United States showed no signs 
of slowing down). 
 43. Fuyuno, supra note 38.  Japanese universities opened 68 new law schools.  Id.  “The 
schools—the first U.S.-style law schools in Japan—started classes [in April 2004] with 5,600 
students enrolled.  They are part of the Japanese government’s ambitious plan to boost the 
number of lawyers to 50,000 by 2018, from 23,000 [in 2004].”  Id. 
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complaint.  They want more lawyers, not fewer.  What does Japan know that 
Derek Bok did not? 
The Japanese apparently have concluded, correctly in my view, that the 
demand for lawyers is a function of the rate of increase in the gross national 
product.44  As the amount of economic activity increases, the number of 
lawyers needed to facilitate that economic activity increases proportionately.  
Lawyers go hand-in-hand with prosperity.  Derek Bok was wrong.  We have 
more lawyers because we have more prosperity. 
As Japan has been deregulating and opening up its markets,45 its economy 
is now expanding, and its companies face more conflicts and more disputes, 
from employee complaints to intellectual-property disputes.46  As Japan 
becomes more prosperous, it needs more lawyers, who implement the business 
transactions that lead to prosperity. 
Just producing more lawyers will not make us richer, any more than 
buying more Picassos will make us richer.  But, as we become richer, we need 
more lawyers (and we develop a taste for acquiring Picassos).  Lawyers neither 
cause prosperity nor stand in the way.  Instead, they are more like grease that 
reduces friction in the economic machine.  Lawyers implement economic 
activity even if they do not originate it.  That is why the long-term demand for 
lawyers is roughly in proportion to the long-term increase in the Gross 
Domestic Product.47  We are growing faster than Europe, so we demand more 
lawyers than Europe.48 
Clients use lawyers to implement financings, plan for contingencies, draft 
contracts, advise on how to handle disputes, and seek redress in the courts, in 
agency actions, or in arbitration.  Clients also use lawyers for rent-seeking 
activity when they lobby agencies or the legislature.  This economic activity 
 
 44. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 36, at 627–29.  The high level of regulation in this country 
does not explain our need for lawyers because Europe has even more regulation, but the number 
of lawyers it has is less, not more.  See B. Peter Pashigian, The Market for Lawyers: The 
Determinants of the Demand for and the Supply of Lawyers, 20 J.L. & ECON. 53, 53–55 (1977).  
It is common to blame the explosion in massive tort suits, and surely it is true that these lawsuits 
have made some lawyers rich, but the number of tort cases does not correspond to increases in the 
profession, and most lawyers do not practice tort law anyway. 
 45. Sebastian Moffett, New Blueprint: Koizumi’s Success Charts the Path to Japan’s Future, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2006, at A1. 
 46. Fuyuno, supra note 38. 
 47. Morgan, supra note 38, at 1794; Morgan, supra note 36, at 627–630; B. Peter Pashigian, 
The Number and Earnings of Lawyers: Some Recent Findings, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 51, 
81 (1978). 
 48. Compare DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN ECONOMY 18 (Spring 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/ 
economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2006/ee206en.pdf (forecasting U.S. growth in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2006 at 3.2%), with id. at 32 (forecasting E.U. growth in GDP 
for 2006 at 2.3%). 
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drives demand for lawyers’ services.  Our increasing trade and the increase in 
the number of our transactions49 means that we need more lawyers to 
implement more business deals.  The “demand for lawyers increases as more 
people get jobs, start businesses, accumulate assets, and have disputes that 
require a lawyer’s attention.”50  As we get richer, we want better things, such 
as a cleaner environment, a safer workplace, and a more just society.  For that, 
we need lawyers.  Lawyers in this country, much more so than in European or 
South American countries, are at the center of business.  When these other 
countries become the deal-makers, they—like Japan—will want more lawyers. 
As these countries create more lawyers, the enforcement of the laws that 
regulate these lawyers will increase, just as we have seen an increase, in our 
post-Enron world, in the enforcement of the legal ethics rules in the United 
States.  The problems may not change that much, but the answers to the 
questions will change as the governing rules change.  And, as the world 
becomes smaller and our global economy becomes integrated, the teaching of 
legal ethics will go international. 
 
 49. Morgan, supra note 36, at 630. 
 50. Id. at 628. 
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